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Abstract
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The Czech Republic had experienced a credit boom 
similar to those in other converging economies in the 
pre-crisis years. Nevertheless, the consequences of this 
credit boom were limited as was the impact of the 
global crisis on domestic financial institutions. This 
paper describes the developments in the Czech banking 
sector and explains how the tough macroeconomic 
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environment in the Czech Republic acted as a strong tool 
of macroprudential policy. It concludes that although 
it is difficult to tame credit booms in small converging 
economies, a concerted set of microprudential and 
macroprudential measures, including monetary and fiscal 
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During the first half of the 1990s, in the initial phase of the Czech Republic’s economic 
transition, the country’s banking sector operated with a relatively high credit–to–gross domestic 
product (GDP) ratio and with loan portfolios concentrated almost exclusively on the corporate 
sector. The deep banking crisis from 1997 to 1999 changed the banking sector dramatically, 
however.  The  sector  went  through  noticeable  downsizing  and  deleveraging  as  a  significant 
amount of credit was written off the banks’ books. By the end of 2001 the banking sector had 
been restructured, and credit growth followed. Even though the credit-to-GDP ratio has remained 
reasonably low since then, a case can be made that the Czech economy experienced a credit 
boom nearly similar to those in other converging economies. The features and quality of the 
boom, however, were quite different. Among the differences were the facts that the growing 
portfolio of loans was financed from local deposits and that lending to the household sector was 
done  in  domestic  currency  only.  Czech  authorities  did  not  resort  to  any  supervisory  or 
administrative measures to tame the credit boom, but its consequences were rather contained, and 
the banking sector was able to provide credit throughout crisis period without major disturbances.  
The basic explanation of this apparent puzzle is that the different qualities of the credit boom in 
the Czech Republic relative to other converging economies have been associated with tough 
macroeconomic policies and the environment that resulted from them.  This paper attempts to 
explain how this scenario worked and what lessons could be taken from it for the future.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section two describes the development of the Czech 
banking sector from the beginning of transition to the current post-crisis period.  Section three 
reviews  how  the  Czech  National  Bank  (CNB),  which  has  both  monetary  and  supervisory 
authority, responded to credit growth in the pre-crisis years.  Section four clarifies how CNB’s 
monetary  policy  and  sustained  nominal  appreciation  of  the  Czech  koruna  acted  as  key 
components  of  macroprudential  policy  in  the  Czech  Republic.    Section  five  focuses  on  the 
identification of the excessive credit in a converging economy.  Section six addresses potential 
future challenges in taming a prospective credit boom and a number of other policy issues, and 
finally section seven offers conclusions.  
 
2. The Czech Banking Sector and Its Credit Cycles  
The financial system in the Czech Republic went through boom and bust in the 1990s, 
associated with swings both in financial system structures and macroeconomic developments.  
The  start  of  the  country’s  economic  transition  from  socialism  in  1991  and  the  subsequent 
privatization of the state-owned firms dramatically increased the demand for banking services, 
credit in particular.  The group of four state-owned commercial banks that were built on the basis 
                                                 
1 This paper was supported by Czech National Bank Research Projects C1/09 and C5/11, and was prepared as 
background  to  a  forthcoming  World  Bank  report  titled  ―Golden  Growth:  Restoring  the  Lustre  of  the  European 
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of the previous ―monobank‖ structure was not able to meet the demand.  Besides natural capacity 
constraints, they were burdened with a legacy of loans that were to a large extent nonperforming.  
In addition, their balance sheets were poisoned by the so-called ―loans for financing of inventory 
needs of firms,‖ which represented quasi-loans from the socialist period.  To address the banking 
sector’s  insufficient  capacity,  a  couple  of  new,  private  banking  institutions  were  allowed  to 
operate.  These institutions began extending credit to new private firms and tradesmen, and at the 
same time they played an important part in providing funding for the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises.  With a loose monetary policy conducted under a regime combining money supply 
targeting and fixed exchange rate, the economy became overheated and the quality of the assets 
of the banking system  weakened.  Authorities initially resorted to partial solutions.   Various 
forms  of  government  assistance  were  used  to  cope  with  inherited  as  well  as  newly  created 
deficiencies. (For details, see Bárta and Singer 2006.)  The full extent of problem came to light 
only  in  the  recession  of  1997–1999.    Decisive  restructuring  and  (re)privatization  of  banks 
followed,  paving  the  way  to  the  current  structure,  in  which  the  sector  is  controlled  almost 
exclusively  by  foreign  banking  groups.    In  addition,  deep  changes  in  the  regulation  and 
supervision of banks, on the one hand, and in monetary policy making, on the other, had to be 
implemented.  The approach was based not on more detailed regulation and tighter monetary 
control but on better and tougher supervision and smarter monetary policy. 
 
Chart 1. Credit and its quality in the Czech 
Republic (1993–2010, in %) 
Chart 2. Sectoral structure of credit in the 





Given the relatively high exposure of the banking sector to the corporate sector associated 
with  legacy  loans,  loans  for  financing  inventory  needs,  and  new  loans  associated  with 
privatization, the credit-to-GDP ratio of the Czech banking sector was  rather high at the early 
stage of transition—roughly 65 percent in 1993 (see Chart 1).  In addition, nearly 90 percent of 
loans in credit portfolios were to the nonfinancial corporate sector.  The share of households in 
the overall credit system stayed below 10 percent throughout the 1990s (Chart 2).  
The deep banking crisis that hit the Czech economy from 1997 to 1999 was caused by a 
mix of flaws in the financial system and suboptimal steps in macroeconomic policies.  (See, for 
example, Frait and Tamarappoo 1998.)  The share of nonperforming loans exceeded 30 percent, 
Source: CNB
Note: Credit growth is year-over-year increase in total bank credit, 
% NPL is the share of nonperforming loans on total bank credit. 
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and sharp contraction of credit followed.  (For a detailed description, see Hampl and Matoušek 
2000.)  Between 1997 and 2000 the credit-to-GDP ratio declined from more than 60 percent to 
less than 40 percent  (Chart  1).  Considering the unfavorable situation in  the major financial 
institutions, the authorities decided to resume the privatization process with the goal of finding 
strong strategic investors.  By the end of 2001 the banking sector was restructured and privatized.  
During  the  process,  all  major  domestic  banks  were  acquired  by  banking  groups  from  the 
European Union.  Soon these banks started to extend loans to the segment of households that had 
been largely ignored by pre-crisis,  semi-state banks.    With the acceleration of the economic 
recovery,  the  performance  of  the  banking  sector  improved  significantly,  and  the  share  of 
nonperforming  loans  decreased  to  less  than  5  percent  in  2003.    The  financial  system 
simultaneously regained its dynamics, and a strong pickup of credit growth followed.  At least 
part  of  this  dynamic  has  to  be  linked  to  overly  optimistic  expectations  associated  with  EU 
membership. 
 
Chart 3. Year-over-year growth rates of a 
bank loans in the Czech Republic (2001–2011, 
in %) 
 
Chart 4. Bank loans to the private sector in 




From the beginning of 2002 until the middle of 2008, credit to the household sector grew 
by 30 percent or slightly more on a year-over-year basis (Chart 3), albeit initially from a very low 
base (Chart 4).  Credit to the nonfinancial corporate sector exhibited a much slower dynamic, but 
between the beginning of 2006 and the middle 2008 it also rose rather fast (15–20 percent).  
Unlike the household credit, the nonfinancial corporate credit started from a much higher base, 
even though its absolute level at the beginning of 2011 was roughly the same as at the beginning 
of 2000. 
Despite comparatively strong credit growth observed in from 2003 to 2007, the stock of 
bank loans relative to income in the Czech Republic was still relatively low at the end of 2007.
2  
This applies not only to a comparison with the advanced euro area economies but also with the 
most economies from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region.   Chart 5 reveals that in 
                                                 
2 One limitation of this comparison is that it is based solely on data on domestic bank loans. This indicator may 
understate total private credit a bit, as it neglects loans provided by nonbank financial intermediaries and loans 
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terms of the private-credit-to-GDP ratio, some countries from the CEE region had reached levels 
typical of some euro area countries. 
Chart 5. Private credit ratios in selected EU 
countries (as % of GDP; 2007 Q4) 
 




The Czech financial system is bank-based, similar to those in other European countries.  
While the depth of financial intermediation measured by the total assets of the financial sector in 
percent  of  GDP  steadily  increases,  reaching  156  percent  in  2010,  the  share  of  banks  in  the 
financial sector remains stable at around 75 percent (Chart 6).  Compared to the euro area, where 
the financial sector assets account for some 570 percent of GDP, financial sector assets in the 
Czech Republic are still relatively low.  The stock market is shallow in the Czech Republic, with 
capitalization of around 38 percent of GDP in 2010 (25 percent in 2003).  
While the majority of loans to the private sector come from local banks, nonbank financial 
intermediaries (such as other companies engaged in lending or in leasing companies) also play 
some role (Chart 7).  In 2004 their share in the loans to the nonfinancial private sector was almost 
20 percent.  However, increasing competition from banks and tax changes in past three years 
(which made leasing financing less favorable than earlier) have contributed to the decline of the 
relevance of these institutions.  In 2010, their share in the loans to the nonfinancial private sector 
reached only 11 percent.  
A remarkable increase in loans can be seen to the real estate industry, due mainly to the 
activities of real estate developers (Chart 8).  Companies active in real estate markets now have 
an even higher share of loans than do manufacturing companies. 
Direct cross-border credit to the private sector also plays a role in the Czech Republic, 
mainly in the case of nonfinancial corporations.  Due to the large share of foreign ownership in 
the  corporate  sector  resulting  from  past  foreign  direct  investment,  corporations  often  use 
intragroup financing directly from their parent companies abroad.  An analysis of loans taken by 
nonfinancial corporations reveals that in 2010 slightly more than 50 percent of credit came from 
the domestic banks while the rest was from other nonbank financial intermediaries, from other 
(domestic)  nonfinancial  corporations,  and  from  nonresidents,  which  include  both  parent 
nonfinancial companies abroad as well as direct cross-border loans from foreign banks (Chart 9). 
 
Source: IMF IFS, authors' calculations
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Chart 7. Loans provided by banks and other 
financial intermediaries (OFIs) 
(CZK billions)  
Chart 8. Corporate loans by industry 
(% of total corporate loans)  
 
   
 
Chart 9. Credit to nonfinancial corporations 
by creditor, (%) 
 
 
Chart 10. Shares of foreign currency bank 




The banking system is completely controlled by foreign banks, usually from other EU 
countries.
3  In 2010, the direct share of foreign banks in total assets was 80 percent, but as some 
banks (mainly specialized building savings societies) are owned by other banks domiciled in the 
Czech Republic, but with foreign owners, the share of banking sector under (direct and indirect) 
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Note: Slovak Republic and Slovenia were already members of the 
euro area in 2009, so their foreign currency loans comprise 
currencies other than EUR.
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foreign control is almost 97 percent (93 percent under the control of banking groups from other 
EU countries, mainly Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy).
4 
In some CEE countries, private loans were provided in foreign currency ( Chart  10), 
especially because foreign interest rates were lower.   This further increased the risks for the 
banking sector, because if the domestic currency depreciated, the volume of credit expressed  in 
the domestic currency would rise, debt servicing costs would go up, and foreign exchange risk 
would turn into credit risk.   In some CEE countries, therefore, the aforementioned measures to 
contain credit growth were targeted primarily at reducing growth   in foreign currency loans 
(Steiner 2011).  Furthermore, if a domestic credit boom is financed from foreign sources, as was 
the case in several CEE countries (except for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland), the risk 
of  the  domestic  banking  sector  hav ing  insufficient  balance -sheet  liquidity  (rollover  risk) 
increases.  In bad times, domestic banks face a high risk of outflows of short -term foreign funds 
that cannot be financed by the sale of liquid assets (Hilbers et al. 2005).  
 
Chart 11. Net external position of banking 
systems (as % of GDP; end-2010) 
 
 
Chart 12. Development of net external 
position of the Czech banking sector (as % of 
total assets)  
 
 
Fortunately, the Czech Republic is one of a very few countries of the CEE region that 
neither experienced a boom in foreign currency lending nor relied on external (foreign) funding 
during the period of high credit growth of 2003–2008.  Households do not take loans in foreign 
currency, while some parts of nonfinancial corporations do so in order to hedge the inflow of 
foreign currency, which come mainly from export revenues.  Despite high foreign ownership, the 
Czech banking sector as a whole has a positive net external position vis-à-vis nonresidents of 
about 7 percent of GDP (Chart 11).  The net external position vis-à-vis non-resident banks is 
                                                 
4 Foreign banks play a key role in the Czech financial system, and fortunately the ownership is not concentrated into 
one or two key EU countries. The three biggest state-owned Czech banks were privatized in the early 2000s to three 
large EU banking groups with origins in different EU countries. This to some extent limits the contagion risk. See 
Geršl (2007). 
Source: IMF IFS, central banks
Austria as of end-2009
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smaller, but still positive (Chart 12).  This suggests that the Czech subsidiaries of foreign banks 
lend to the parent groups they belong to (Chart 13).
5 
Chart 13. Lending of banks in the Czech 
Republic to parent groups (gross exposure of 
six biggest banks to parent groups, as % of 
assets) 
 
Chart 14. Ratio of deposits to loans granted in 





Overall, the Czech economy experienced a credit boom similar to those in other CEE 
countries in the pre-crisis years.  The features and quality of the boom, however, were quite 
different.    First,  fast  credit  growth  was  concentrated  to  the  household  sector,  while  the 
developments in the corporate sector lending were rather smooth.  Second, the increase in lending 
was  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  base  of  local  deposits  and  was  thus  financed  from 
domestic  savings,  not  foreign  sources  (Chart  14).    Moreover,  the  local  deposit  base  is 
predominantly in domestic currency, so there was no incentive for banks to offer foreign currency 
loans to minimize possible currency mismatches on their balance sheets.  Third, lending to the 
household sector was done in domestic currency only, and there was no additional risk except for 
the  credit  one  associated  with  growing  housing  loan  portfolio  of  the  Czech  banking  sector.  
Finally, the boom in housing loans may have not been as fast as it seems.  The increased demand 
for these loans in 2006–2007 was also due to an expected increase in value-added tax (VAT) on 
construction work from 5 percent to 19 percent as of 1 January 2008, as announced already in 
2005.
6  All this suggests that there are particular factors behind the credit boom in the Czech 
Republic that explain its different quality.   In the next section we describe how differences in 
macroeconomic policies were key among them.  
 
3. The CNB’s Approach to the Credit Growth Issue 
                                                 
5 There is a regulatory limit on lending to parent groups that amount to 25 percent of regulatory capital. This limit is 
however applied on the so-called adjusted exposure (for example, if the parent bank is a bank from another EU 
country, 80 percent of the gross exposure can be deducted when calculating adjusted exposure). Most banks in the 
Czech Republic are around the half of the regulatory limit.  
6 Due to this factor, a number of creditworthy households shifted their plans regarding the purchase or building of 
housing and frontloaded the loans much earlier to take the opportunity of the still lower taxation. 
Source: CNB.
Note: Lending to parent groups includes gross exposures to all 
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Thanks to lessons learned from crisis of the 1990s, the CNB entered the new century with 
an explicit, history-based, macroprudential mandate in the minds of central bankers.  The CNB 
adopted a definition of financial stability consistent with current thinking about the financial 
stability objective back in 2004: a situation in which the financial system operates with no serious 
failures or undesirable impacts on the present and future development of the economy as a whole, 
while  showing  a  high  degree  of  resilience  to  shocks.    Another  core  element  of  the  CNB’s 
financial  stability  framework  is  its  definition  of  financial  stability  analysis  as  the  study  of 
potential sources of systemic risk arising from the links between vulnerabilities in the financial 
system and potential shocks coming from various sectors of the economy, the financial markets, 
and macroeconomic developments.  
These  definitions  explicitly  emphasize  the  macroprudential  orientation  of  the  CNB’s 
financial stability policies.  The objective of these policies is to ensure that the financial system 
does not become so vulnerable that shocks causing financial instability ultimately result in a 
crisis.  The CNB’s financial stability analyses contained in its Financial Stability Reports have 
therefore been focused on determining whether weak spots are forming in the financial system 
that might reduce its resilience to shocks and whether conditions are being created in which the 
interaction of macroeconomic factors and policies; excessive household, corporate, government, 
or financial institution debt; and financial market volatility could cause a financial crisis.  An 
empirical  analysis  of  the  history  of  financial  crises  reveals  that  the  financial  cycle—whose 
primary features are changes in credit growth and in the level of debt of economic agents—
usually lies at the heart of systemic financial crises, with strong negative impacts on output.
7  The 
prime focus of the CNB’s financial stability analyses was therefore the potential for a credit-led 
bubble, since a bursting of such a bubble and negative macroeconomic developments, leading to 
external financing constraints and growth in nonperforming loans, can cause the banking sector 
serious difficulties.  This fear is consistent with existing studies in the field of early warning 
signals, according to which excessive credit growth can be considered one of the most reliable 
indicators of future problems in the banking sector (Borio and Lowe 2002; Borio and Drehmann 
2009; Jimenez and Saurina 2006; Saurina et al. 2008). 
The CNB has been rather open and vocal as far as the risks associated with credit and debt 
levels in the economy are concerned.  Despite the low level of private credit relative to income 
(Chart 5), the CNB launched at the beginning of 2006 series of analyses focusing preemptively 
on whether a prolonged period of sustained credit growth could bring systemic risks for financial 
stability and how to assess the ―excessiveness‖ of credit in the private sector.  Since real estate is 
usually a prime suspect in excess credit and often warrants a presumption of guilt, soon after real 
estate prices started to rise in 2006 (Chart 15), the CNB issued warning in its 2006 Financial 
Stability Report (page 9) that ―a comparison of flat prices and income indicates a possibility of an 
emerging bubble on the property market.‖  This message was taken seriously by both the media 
and the financial industry.  Mindful of the experience of the 1990s, the CNB experts were aware 
of the fact that potential impact of a lending boom on quality of banks’ balance sheets is hard to 
assess,  since  the  new  loans  tend  to  dilute  the  old  ones,  including  the  bad  ones,  and  the 
vulnerability indicators are therefore strongly lagging.  The 2007 Financial Stability Report (page 
63) warns that ―asset quality, measured by the share of default loans, does not deteriorate despite 
the credit expansion, as the rise in default loans is diluted by the growth in new loans.‖  
                                                 
7 IMF (2004) estimates that more than 75 percent of credit booms were followed by banking or currency crises.   10 
Excessive credit growth can threaten macroeconomic stability in many ways.  Given that 
lending  supports  consumption,  growth  in  private  sector  loans  can  overstimulate  aggregate 
demand beyond the potential output and cause the economy to overheat, with subsequent effects 
on inflation, the current account deficit, interest rates, and the real exchange rate.  At the same 
time, lending institutions can, in an economic growth phase, have overoptimistic expectations 
about borrowers’ future ability to repay their debts and therefore very often lend to high-risk 
borrowers.  The upshot is that the bulk of ―potentially‖ bad loans arise during upward phases of 
the credit cycle.  An analysis of corporate loans’ monthly default rates shows that loans provided 
in the major boom years 2006 and 2007 defaulted at a higher rate than loans provided earlier 
(Chart 16).  
 
Chart 15. Prices of flats in the Czech Republic 
(2005 = 100)  
 
Chart 16. Monthly default rate by vintage of 
loans, (corporate loans only; in %) 
 
 
The explanations provided above reveal that the Czech Republic and its central bank, 
unlike some other countries in the CEE region, did not resort to any supervisory or administrative 
measures to tame the credit boom.  The only measures of a macroprudential kind consisted of 
open communication and public warnings.  Still, the consequences of the crisis were relatively 
contained,  and  the  banking  sector  was  able  to  provide  credit  throughout  without  major 
disturbances.  Particular qualities of the credit boom in the Czech Republic relative to those in 
other  converging  economies  have  been  to  a  large  extent  associated  with  the  specific 
macroeconomic  environment  in  which  the  Czech  economy  has  been  operating.    Prudent 
macroeconomic  policies  and  tough  monetary  conditions  were  the  key  ingredients  of  the 
macroprudential policy toolkit.  At the same time, as well as during the 2008–2009 crisis, the fact 
that both monetary policy and banking supervision have always been the responsibilities of the 
central bank proved to be rather important.  With the benefit of hindsight, one can say that the 
specific macroeconomic environment has had a strong impact on the risks associated with the 
operation of the banking sector, its lending activity, and its policy reaction to the credit boom 
phenomenon.  We attempt to explain the actual working of this environment in the next section.  
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The CNB and the Czech economy in general have been operating in a rather specific 
environment since 2001.  The period since 2001 has been characterized by appreciating currency, 
low inflation, and stable and low interest rates.  The Czech Republic has become an exemplary 
case of an inflation-targeting economy with sustained appreciation pressures.  Due to the fact 
that, from the outset of the economic transition until the present time, the Czech currency has 
appreciated strongly in nominal terms against both the dollar and the euro, the koruna has gained 
the status of a safe haven currency.  However, with this status it has also become quite sensitive 
to changes in global financial markets, especially to the search for yield by the international 
investors.
8  This became the case primarily after the key central banks resorted to accommodative 
monetary policies following the events of September 2001.   Since then the Czech koruna has 
exhibited a tendency to appreciate, sometimes quite sharply.
9 Sustained currency appreciation has 
had far reaching and to a large extent surprising consequences.   The Czech Republic (together 
with Slovakia that exhibited similar patterns) operated in an environment that was rather different 
from the one existing in other economies that used to be included in the groups like CEE.  
Despite the fact that the Czech economy is export-oriented and has a large manufacturing 
sector, the country has openly adopted the position that it cannot and will not try to artificially 
soften the conditions for domestic producers.
10  The CNB has explained that there are global 
pressures that a small economy cannot avoid and that businesses have to learn how to weather 
them.  This kind of approach has contributed to the flexibility of the economy—something that a 
small economy in global competition crucially needs.  Though initially it was quite difficult, and 
in some cases painful, exporters have learned how to live with the tough exchange rate conditions 
and have factored the future evolution of these conditions into their expectations.  Labor unions 
have  realized  that  currency  appreciation  improves  the  purchasing  power  of  workers’  wages, 
which has helped to discipline wage dynamics. 
The tendency of the koruna to appreciate over time has had a significant impact on the 
conduct of monetary policy.  As a consequence of appreciation pressures, Czech inflation has 
often undershot the inflation target.  In such a situation, the CNB naturally has had to keep its 
policy rate also at a similar or even lower level relative to the key central banks in order to avoid 
protracted and deep undershooting of its target.  It has repeatedly communicated that its natural 
reaction  in  the  inflation  targeting  framework  is  to  cut  the  policy  rates  in  case  of  strong 
                                                 
8 Globalization and liberalization of the financial markets made domestic monetary policy subject to arbitrage. The 
search for yield may be viewed as the attempt of domestic investors to avoid constraints imposed by their central 
bank’s policy. And demand for ―cheaper‖ loans denominated in foreign currencies is de facto arbitrage on the side of 
borrowers. 
9 The Czech currency has thus gained a very specific position—international investors have been buying it as a high-
yielding asset from a successful emerging market economy, and some have been borrowing and selling it because it 
has served, like the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, as a funding currency for carry trades. Not surprisingly, after 
the onset of the financial turmoil in August 2007, the koruna appreciated sharply. After the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, market sentiment toward the emerging markets in general, and the CEE region in particular, turned quite 
negative, which led to a sharp depreciation of all the regional currencies, the koruna being the exception only to a 
limited extent. Once the markets settled in 2009, the koruna set off on an appreciation trend again, and like some 
other emerging economies it has occasionally been exposed to search-for-yield induced pressures. 
10 The CNB’s attitude to exchange rate management has evolved over time. While there were three episodes of 
interventions against the exchange rate appreciation in the early years of inflation targeting, the CNB has not used 
direct foreign exchange interventions since late 2002. In the latter phase, the only measure indirectly affecting the 
exchange rate was an agreement with the government on purchases of privatization revenues (and more recently of 
the inflow of EU structural and cohesion funds) into the CNB’s foreign exchange reserves. Since spring 2008, the 
International Monetary Fund has classified the Czech de facto exchange rate regime as free floating.    12 
disinflation pressures.  On first impression it might appear that a policy of low interest rates in a 
converging economy must be rather suboptimal since it must lead to a credit boom.  However, in 
reality  this  policy  has  served  more  as  a  shield  against  the  risks  coming  from  the  external 
environment.  Of course, the idea of using a policy of low interest rates in a small emerging 
economy to  shield  the  country  from  risks  stemming from  developed countries’  policies may 
sound strange.  The monetary scene in the pre-crisis years was strange indeed.  One way or 
another,  the  Czech  financial  sector  came  out  of  the  crisis  relatively  untouched  despite  the 
economy inevitably slipping into a rather sharp recession. 
The case of the Czech economy provides important lessons about how the expansionary 
effects of low short-term interest rates may be curtailed by the effects of nominal appreciation of 
the domestic currency.  Currency appreciation can contribute to financial stability especially in a 
booming economy.    It  can help  to  reduce risks  through a ―favorable‖  nominal  illusion.    An 
appreciating currency will slow the growth rate of nominal income, which may restrict over-
optimism regarding its future trend.  This can, in turn, slow the growth in loan demand.  Such an 
―illusion‖ means that the households will compare low interest rates with slow growth in nominal 
income, all expressed in the domestic currency.  In reality, the purchasing power of nominal 
income will be increasing relatively fast thanks to the currency appreciation, but households will 
not reflect it in their decision making.  Evidence for the existence of this kind of illusion has been 
provided by the experience of a group of countries in the CEE region.  Seemingly, sustained 
currency  appreciation  should  create  an  incentive  to  borrow  in  a  currency  that  is  becoming 
cheaper over time, that is, in foreign currency.  Nevertheless, the share of foreign currency loans 
provided to households has been lowest in two countries with a history of profound and sustained 
nominal  currency  appreciation—the Czech Republic and Slovakia.    It  may thus be said  that 
households from these countries have ―suffered‖ from an illusion in the sense that they have 
ignored the opportunity to take advantage of appreciation by deciding that when borrowing they 
would do so in the domestic currency only.  
There may also be other factors specific to a small open economy at play.  First, if the 
economy  is  export  oriented,  a  sustained  exchange  rate  appreciation  may  work  against  the 
formation of overly optimistic expectations in the corporate sector,
11 which tames the potential 
for credit-enabled excessive investment and the creation of unprofitable capacity.   It may also 
shift part of the existing domestic demand from nontradables to tradables , thus contributing to 
more balanced macroeconomic and structural dynamics.    One should not forget that in an 
environment characterized by currency appreciation and low domestic  interest rates households 
do not have any incentive to borrow in a foreign cur rency, which insulates their balance sheets 
from exchange-rate risk.
12  In addition, with low interest rates the currency is not an attractive 
target, at least for some classes of speculators, which can partially reduce its volatility.  
                                                 
11 In a country with a high share of tradables in production (an export-oriented economy with a strong manufacturing 
sector), the monetary conditions and financial constraints on the corporate sector may be significantly influenced by 
changes in the external value of the currency. In particular, trend nominal appreciation or a prolonged period of a 
―strong‖ currency will create monetary and financial constraints for the relevant sectors and thus reduce the risk of 
implementation of investment projects with relatively low profitability (projects profitable only under expectations of 
very low interest rates).  
12 There are those who believe that the rapid growth in real estate prices in the Czech Republic in 2005 –2009 was 
due also to very low short-term rates and their contribution to the demand for housing credit. But it was probably due 
to the combination of an expected significant increase in the VAT on housing construction and the emergence of 
optimistic expectations about future income. After all, a similar boom was observed in other CEE countries, where   13 
The Czech Republic was not the only country that permitted for sizeable appreciation of 
its currency, inflation target undershooting, or both in the pre-crisis period.  Similar patterns 
could  have been observed in  other inflation targeters,  for  example, Canada, Korea, Norway, 
Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland.  The exchange rate obviously played a very important role in 
the monetary conditions in some small economies in the pre-crisis years.  Positive outcomes in 
terms  of  price  and  financial  stability  were  achieved  in  the  countries  in  which  central  banks 
responded to exchange rate pressures broadly in a flexible inflation-targeting style.  In particular, 
a strategy of reacting to the appreciation pressures pragmatically by cutting policy rates a bit and 
simultaneously allowing for some appreciation worked well. 
Chart 17. Currency Appreciation in Selected Inflation-Targeting Economies 
   
Source: Thomson Datastream. 
Note: January 2001 = 100. Decline means appreciation. 
The explanation for the success depicted above is not a straightforward one.  Basically, 
central bankers in small and open economies have been much more willing to accept that credit 
booms  and  asset-price  bubbles  can  emerge  without  signs  of  inflationary  pressures  and  that 
inflation measured in terms of consumer prices has not always signaled a buildup of imbalances 
in the economy.  In some countries they felt—partly as a result of their own experience—that 
strong credit expansion and increasing asset prices preceded almost all banking crises and the 
majority of deep recessions.  Some of them could also easily imagine a realistic scenario in which 
a bubble builds up without visible signs of inflationary pressures.  Such a scenario can arise when 
higher  economic  growth  creates  excessively  optimistic  expectations  about  the  future  of  the 
economy that lead to nominal appreciation of its currency.  In such a situation, very low inflation 
can prevail for a long time even under rapid credit growth and asset price acceleration.  When 
agents recognize that the real situation is not so rosy, and open inflation pressures subsequently 
appear, it may be too late for monetary policy to react. In addition, excessive demand, especially 
in small economies, may for a long time be reflected in rising current account deficits rather than 
in inflationary pressures. 
                                                                                                                                                              
central banks maintained much higher rates. In these countries, however, the maintaining of higher domestic interest 
rates resulted in households and corporations switching to foreign currency loans, which further increased the risks to 
financial stability. See also Čihák and Mitra (2009). 
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Some central banks therefore understood that the risks of a hard landing from the buildup 
and bursting of large asset price bubbles warranted taking some risks in an attempt to moderate 
the problem.  There were cases in which the asset price misalignment was sufficiently obvious 
that one could be confident enough to take the risk.  In such cases, tightening monetary policy 
and  accepting  somewhat  lower  inflation  relative  to  the  target  in  the  short  term  provided  a 
possibility of avoiding a subsequent collapse in asset prices that could lead to large losses in 
terms  of  real  output.    In  addition  to  tough  inflation  targeters  in  Norway,  Sweden,  and 
Switzerland,  several  other  central  banks  showed  significant  willingness  to  allow  the  foreign 
exchange  value  of  their  currencies  adjust  in  the  pre-crisis  years  by  not  resisting  fully  the 
appreciation pressures (Chart 17).  These countries avoided to some extent the adverse effects of 
a general asymmetry of pre-crisis monetary policy making, which consisted of a much greater 
readiness to accept some depreciation of the domestic currency relative to appreciation.  They 
applied, albeit sometimes unwittingly, the prescription of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) approach, in which a successful leaning-against-the-wind policy requires the central bank 
to tighten monetary conditions above the level consistent with fulfillment of the inflation target 
and reduces inflation below the inflation target.  It is reasonable nominal appreciation of the 




5. Identifying Excessive Credit in a Converging Economy 
One of the key lessons from the most recent financial crisis is that the authorities should 
pay attention to the risk of excessive credit growth; their macroprudential analyses must struggle 
to identify it no matter how difficult it is.  A major problem in constructing an excessive credit 
growth indicator is determining what level of credit is excessive and might pose a threat to the 
financial sector.  One traditional method is to apply the statistical Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, 
which obtains the trend from a time series.  By comparing the actual credit-to-GDP ratio with its 
long-term trend obtained using the HP filter we can then estimate whether or not the credit level 
is excessive.  This method is used quite routinely in the literature (Borio and Lowe 2002; Borio 
and Drehmann 2009).  Hilbers et al. (2005), for example, consider a credit-to-GDP gap of greater 
than 5 percent to be an indicator of excessive credit in the economy.  
Although the HP filter method is used quite often to determine trends in macroeconomic 
variables, it has its drawbacks.  A time series trend is dependent to a significant extent on the 
length of the chosen time series, and the calculation is very sensitive to the smoothing parameter 
(lambda).  A significant problem in terms of practical application in macroprudential policy is 
―end-point bias,‖ which generates a highly unreliable estimate of the trend at the end of the data 
period.
14  Macroprudential policy, which, by contrast, requires assessment of the trend on the 
basis of current (end-of-period) data, would therefore be reliant on indicators subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty. In the case of some CEE countries with relatively short time  series, credit 
growth is incorporated directly into the trend itself by the HP filter (Cottarelli et al. 2005).   
                                                 
13 Small open economies do not generally have a menu choice between the levels of interest rate and exchange rate. 
We intentionally talk about the willingness of the authorities to permit the currencies to appreciate if pressures in this 
direction prevail. By this we emphasize that the strategy described above can be available in some specific periods 
only. 
14 One way of dealing with end-point bias is to extend the time series into the future by means of prediction. This, 
however, can introduce further uncertainty into the estimate linked with the quality of the prediction.   15 
Another relevant question is whether the credit ratio should take into account other denominators 
besides GDP, such as financial assets or total assets of the private sector.  Although GDP is 
correlated to a significant extent with private sector income and therefore serves as an indicator 
of  the  ability  to  repay  a  given  amount  of  loans,  holdings  of  financial  assets  (deposits  and 
securities investments) and nonfinancial assets (for example, real estate) are also relevant to the 
evaluation of excessive credit. 
Chart 18 presents credit gaps with alternative denominators (GDP and financial assets and 
total assets of the private sector) calculated using the HP filter on data for bank loans in the 
Czech Republic with a high lambda (400,000) as proposed in Basel III.  The filter is applied to 
quarterly data for the period 1998–2010, which, however, is regarded as relatively short from the 
international perspective (Basel III recommends at least a 20-year period).  The estimates indicate 
that the current level of bank loans is below the long-term trend.  However, the trend estimate is 
subject to a range of problems related to the short time series—above all to extraordinary factors 
linked with a fall in credit volume in 1998–2002, which was caused by a banking crisis in the 
1990s, and the cleanup of bank balance sheets ahead of the privatization of large banks.  
 
Chart 18. Credit gaps in the Czech Republic 




Chart 19. Credit-to-GDP ratios for a similar 
level of economic development (in %; GDP per 
capita in 2005 USD = USD 17,000 approx.) 
 
 
As regards simulating possible macroprudential policy in the past, it makes more sense to 
apply the HP filter recursively: in each past period using only the data that were available in that 
period.  (At the end of 2005, for example, the trend value and therefore also the gap between the 
observed credit level and the trend is calculated on 1998–2005 data.)  This simulates the situation 
that the macroprudential policy maker would hypothetically have found itself in  had it been 
required to decide whether excessive credit growth was emerging.  The calculated credit gaps 
expressed as a percentage of GDP indicate that the Czech Republic would have found itself in a 
situation  of  excessive  credit  as  early  as  2004  (Chart 18).    However,  the  aforementioned 
drawbacks of the HP filter play an even greater role in the calculated gap, as the problem period 
of 1998–2002 influences the trend. 
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(1983)  16 
The main criticism of the HP filter technique, however, is that this method does not take 
into account economic fundamentals that affect the equilibrium stock of loans.  An alternative 
method is to estimate the equilibrium private credit level in relation to key economic variables 
(such as the level of development of the economy measured in terms of real GDP per capita).  In 
nutshell, this method says that if GDP per capita—as a proxy for the standard of living in an 
economy—is  the main and only  economic fundamental,  all countries  with  the same level  of 
development should have a similar equilibrium credit level.  Poorer countries should have a lower 
equilibrium credit level than wealthier countries. A comparison of bank loans as a percentage of 
GDP for the Czech Republic in 2009 and selected euro area countries in years when they were at 
a similar level of economic development indicates, in contrast to the HP filter findings, that the 
credit ratio in the Czech Republic is below the level consistent with its economic level (Chart 
19).
15 
Given that the CEE countries started from very low private credit levels, however, the 
estimation of a suitable econometric model on data for these countries  would capture the rapid 
growth caused by convergence towards the average level of the advanced nations.  As Égert et al. 
(2006, 14) point out, such estimated elasticities of the relationships between fundamentals and 
credit would be overstated.   At the same time, the estimates would reflect not the equilibrium 
level but the present relationship between economic fundamentals and private credit.  
For  this  reason,  the  existing  literature  suggests  using  out -of-sample  (OOS)  panel 
estimation: estimating the model on a different sample of countries and applying the elasticities 
obtained to the data for the countries for which the equilibrium credit level is being estimated.   
This approach assumes a priori that the stock of credit in OOS countries is at equilibrium  on 
average, which is quite a significant assumption.   Therefore, one needs to choose suitable OOS 
countries that best meet the need to estimate the correct equilibrium relationships between 
economic fundamentals and private credit.  The existing studies on this topic normally use the 
developed countries of the EU or Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as 
an appropriate OOS comparison (Kiss et al. 2006; Égert et al. 2006).  For this study, the advanced 
EU countries were used as OOS countries.  Owing to the current debate regarding the excessive 
debt of the PIIGS
16 countries, those were omitted from the calculation of the equilibrium credit 
level.
17 
A variety of econometric methods can be used for OOS estimation.   Given the properties 
of the variables used, however, traditional panel methods run into the problem of non -stationary 
time series, the mutual regression of which can lead to spurious results.   The traditional solution 
to the problem of non-stationary variables involves differentiating them.  This step allows us to 
obtain  the  short -run  relationship  between  the  variables  by  regression,  but  the  long -run 
relationship is lost in the differentiation.    The long-run relationship between non -stationary 
variables can be better estimated if the variables are co-integrated.  This fact is used by the error 
                                                 
15 This comparison of the level of economic development is based on average GDP per capita expressed in real USD 
and can be interpreted as the same volume of goods that could be bought in the United States with the average GDP 
of the given country in the given year. 
16 Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. 
17 However, nations that are structurally quite different from the CEE countries, such as the United Kingdom, remain 
in the sample of control countries. This may skew the results of the analysis toward higher equilibrium credit values 
for a given set of economic fundamentals.   17 
correction model (ECM) method, which estimates not only the long-run relationship between the 
cointegrated variables, but also the potential short-run deviations from this long-run relationship. 
We use the pooled mean group (PMG) estimation method, introduced for panel estimates 
by Pesaran et al. (1999).  It, too, is based on this principle of short-run deviations from the long-
run trend.  This method can be used to estimate the long-run relationship between the credit-to-
GDP  ratio  and  other  variables,  which  is  identical  for  all  countries,  whereas  the  short-run 
deviations from this relationship can differ across countries.  The PMG model, therefore, allows 
heterogeneity of the estimates for individual countries in the short run.  However, the long-run 
relationship of the cointegrated variables is common to all the countries in the sample. 
The data used for the OOS method were obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS)  database,  which  provides  the  required  macroeconomic 
data with  a sufficient history (which is vital for estimating long-run relationships).  For this 
reason, we used data for a 30-year period (1980–2010).  The available statistics on bank loans to 
the private sector were used as the credit indicator.  These statistics slightly underestimate the 
total credit of the private sector, as they do not include nonbank financial intermediaries (for 
example,  leasing)  and  cross-border  loans.    Data  on  aggregate  household  consumption, 
government  debt,  short-term  interest  rates,  unemployment,  inflation  measured  by  the  GDP 
deflator, and GDP per capita in dollar terms were also used. 
A  long-run  cointegration  relationship  between  the  credit-to-GDP  ratio,  the  household 
consumption-to-GDP ratio, and GDP per capita in US dollars was identified for the OOS set of 
countries.  The GDP per capita variable in the long-run relationship captures the different degree 
of wealth of the economy, which therefore also influences the equilibrium private credit level 
(Terrones and Mendoza 2004). 
The following equation gives estimates of the coefficients of the long-run relationship 
between the co-integrated variables and the values of the coefficients in the short run, which are 
given as the mean of all the estimates for the relevant countries. 
 
∆ (credit/gdp)t =  credit/gdpt-1  - 0.7cons/gdpt  - 0.13 gdp/popt  }long-run relationship 
         
  ∆(cons/gdp)t-1  0.07inft-1   + 0.014  }short-run deviations 
         
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance of the estimated coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Credit/gdp represents the ratio of private sector credit to GDP, cons/gdp denotes the ratio 
of household consumption to GDP, gdp/pop is GDP per capita in dollar terms, and inf is the 
change in the price level, expressed as the year-on-year change in the GDP deflator. 
Besides  the  aforementioned  variables,  other  factors  that  might  affect  the  explained 
credit/gdp ratio were included in the model.  For example, the government debt-to-GDP ratio 
might capture any crowding out of bank lending to the private sector.
18  Also, the real interest 
rate, or changes therein, should, as the cost of financing, be in a negative relationship with the 
                                                 
18 For this reason, we would expect a negative relationship between the government debt ratio and loans to the 
private sector. The fact that a less indebted government sector would be able to provide more significant support if 
the banking sector ran into serious problems is relevant for assessing whether the current private sector credit level is 
excessive with regard to financial stability.   18 
explained variable.  However, as the final specification of the model indicates, these variables 
were not significant even at the 15 percent level.  On the basis of the model, short-run deviations 
from the long-run trend are given as a function of the change in the consumption-to-GDP ratio 
and as a function of inflation.  Based on the estimated coefficients, we can conclude that in the 
long-run relationship the credit-to-GDP ratio increases with increasing wealth of the economy 
and  with  an  increasing  consumption-to-GDP  ratio.    This  factor  then  positively  affects  the 
explained  variable  in  the  short-run  relationship  as  well,  while  inflation  acts  in  the  opposite 
direction.    These  conclusions  are  in  accordance  with  intuition  as  regards  the  effects  of  the 
variables used on the credit-to-GDP ratio. 
 
Chart 20. Comparison of credit-to-GDP ratios 
for the Czech Republic: HP versus OOS (in 
p.p.) 
 
Chart 21. Credit-to-GDP gap via out-of-
sample and NPL change in 2009 (gap in p.p.; 
change in NPL ratio in p.p.) 
 
 
The estimated parameters of the model were applied to data for the Czech Republic to 
obtain  values  of  the  ―equilibrium‖  credit  ratio.
19    The  OOS  calculations  imply  significantly 
different conclusions regarding excessive credit compared to the calculations using the HP filter 
(Chart 20).  According to the HP filter, the credit-to-GDP gap indicates for the Czech Republic 
excessive credit in the recent period, whereas the econometric estimate does not confirm this 
excessive credit level (values in the positive part of the chart indicate excessive private credit-to-
GDP ratios).  Although statistical filtering techniques such as the HP filter do have a role to play 
in the analysis as a first step in the interpretation of the available data, a broader set of indicators 
and methods should be employed to determine a country’s position in the credit cycle.  
An analysis of relationship between an increase in nonperforming loans during the crisis 
year 2009 and credit-to-GDP gaps estimated by OOS before the crisis (in the second half of 
2008) for all CEE countries of the EU indicates that the most indebted countries experienced the 
largest  increase  in  credit  risk  (Chart 21).    After  developing  further  the  methods  based  on 
economic fundamentals  such as the OOS, we are considering using the results in calibrating 
countercyclical capital buffers once Basel III is implemented.  
 
                                                 
19 We applied the parameters also to other CEE countries. The results and the accompanying discussion of  the 
consequences for the countercyclical capital buffer are discussed in Geršl and Seidler (2011). 
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6. Taming a Credit Boom: Future Challenges 
Generally, it may very difficult to try to tame credit booms in small economies and limit 
the  probability  of  the  boom-and-bust  development  in  certain  periods.    These  are  primarily 
macroeconomic phenomena associated with broad socioeconomic movements reflected in the 
buildup of excessively optimistic expectations about future income and asset prices growth.  In its 
Financial Stability Reports published in the pre-crisis times, the CNB pursued this particular 
view: that the growing risks for financial stability were to a large degree determined by the 
macroeconomic factors and associated primarily with the emergence of excessively optimistic 
expectations regarding the future development of income and asset prices.
20  For this reason, a 
macroeconomic, or more precisely, broad macroprudential approach is needed.  Monetary policy 
should  constitute  an  important  part  of  the  approach.    However,  even  a  well -developed 
autonomous monetary policy may have a very limited room for maneuver.   In small economies, 
higher interest rates on domestic currency loans may help only if the banks historically have not 
established markets for mortgages in foreign currencies.    In countries with floating, desired 
monetary tightening can be achieved, but only to some extent, via a combination of currency 
appreciation  and  policy  rate  adjustment,  with  a  simultaneous  application  of  various 
macroprudential measures, including fiscal ones.   Countries with fixed exchange rates or high 
level  of  euroization  can  use  less  standard  monetary  policy  tools  (such  as  various  reserve 
requirements) only.  
The basic recommendation for small and converging economies is to avoid as much as 
possible the expansionary effects of the foreign banks’ operations and capital inflows by making 
financial sector work as nearly as possible as if it was a purely domestic one.  This means that 
local banks ideally would use domestic sources for lending activity and carry on their business 
mainly in domestic currency.  A sufficient base of deposits from domestic entities, therefore, 
seems to be one of the prerequisites for a stability of the banking system.  Such a base makes the 
system resilient to sudden evaporations of resources from abroad or from financial markets.  In 
addition, the strong ability of the domestic banking sector to accumulate domestic savings via 
deposits  secures  the  long-term  funding  for  the  investments  so  needed  for  boosting  the 
convergence process.  And the currency structure of borrowing is linked to the one of saving.  If 
people have long-term incentive to save in domestic currency, they will also view borrowing in it 
as natural.  
Generally, there is no one-size-fits-all solution available for countries.  In any country, the 
authorities have to search for a specific combination of macro- and microprudential measures to 
succeed.    The  efficiency  in  providing  such  a  combination  is  critically  dependent  on  the 
organization of regulation and supervision in a country.  
6.1 The organization of supervision at the national level 
The stability of the financial sector in small converging economies very much depends on 
the ability to establish independent, strong, and respected supervision.  Among the key reasons 
behind recent financial turmoil in mature economies were the deficiencies in financial sector 
                                                 
20  An  example  of  the  macro  view  is  a  statement  from  2006  Financial  Stability  Report  (page  13):  ―The  Czech 
Republic is currently facing a risk of excessively optimistic expectations regarding its future development, driven by 
the high GDP growth rates, which, however, may not present a faithful picture of the improvement in household 
income.‖   20 
regulation and failure of supervisors to understand risks and act accordingly.  Whereas a process 
or redesigning of regulatory rules is fully under way, strengthening of supervisory practice is 
much less in the focus of the policy makers.  And while the regulation is being decided mainly on 
the EU level, improving the conduct of supervision is primarily a domestic task.  It is not realistic 
to expect that new regulations adopted on the European level will rapidly improve the stability of 
national markets.  And regulation is just a prerequisite for stability—the quality of supervision 
may matter even more.  Banking remains largely a local business based on specific knowledge of 
local markets.  National supervisory institutions have the strongest incentives to use information 
on local markets and perform supervisory work as responsibly as possible.  All this constitutes an 
important argument for performing banking supervision at the national level. 
The  important  lesson  of  current  crisis  is  that  meeting  the  principles  for  effective 
supervision is important, but organization might be even more important.  What really matters are 
the relations among all decision makers that have something to do with financial stability.  The 
recent changes to the structure of the financial system made a strong case for the integration of 
sectoral supervisors into a single national supervisor.  The experience gained while handling the 
crisis  also  made  the  integration  of  supervisory  structures  in  a  central  bank  attractive.    All 
stakeholders expect a central bank to act as a lender of last resort—r even a market maker of last 
resort—but without sufficient information and knowledge of the state of affairs this is a difficult 
task.  We strongly recommend that small European economies expecting to adopt the euro in the 
future integrate regulation and supervision in independent national central banks.  The merits of 
this model are numerous.  It allows a focus on systemic risk (integration of prudential supervision 
of individual entities and risk assessment across the financial sector as a whole), information-
sharing  synergies,  strong  technical  and  professional  support,  and  independent  and  apolitical 
decision  making,  among  other  benefits.    We  regard  the  existence  of  strong,  independent 
institutions  of  consolidated  financial  market  supervision  across  all  segments  as  the  key  step 
toward  enhancing  the  communication  and  coordination  of  measures  adopted  in  the  EU.  
Consolidation of financial market regulation and supervision at the national level in a central 
bank will create conditions for the effective exchange of truly relevant data, data integration, and 
potential consolidation of analytical work.  
In a period when financial imbalances accumulate, the decision-making body (the board 
of a central bank) enjoys full information coverage from the real economy—financial markets as 
well as supervisory departments.  This has important preemptive potential, since the body has a 
strong  incentive  to  react  (for  example,  with  monetary  tools)  if  the  signs  of  overheating  are 
accompanied by the signs of relaxed lending standards and deteriorating credit quality.   The 
division of tasks between a central bank and a stand-alone supervisor creates the risk of delayed 
actions due to disrupted information flows and reliance on actions of other stakeholders.  In real 
crisis,  the  single  institution  is  ideally  placed  for  cooperating  with  government  and  acting 
expeditiously.  
There is a traditional argument against integration of the central bank and the supervisory 
body based on the potential conflict between monetary policy and financial stability.  Judging 
from the experience of the Czech National Bank, we regard the risk of materialization of this 
potential conflict as marginal.  Moreover, decision making on monetary policy and supervision 
can be effectively separated within a single institution.  We believe that the integration of both 
roles in a single institution will increase the sense of responsibility of monetary policy makers for 
financial stability and vice versa.  The last crisis provides enough evidence that the supervisory   21 
bodies  of  the  Financial  Services  Authority  sort  often  ignored  warnings  of  central  bankers 
regarding  the  impact  of  cycles  on  financial  stability.    Finally,  despite  the  separation  of 
responsibilities in some countries hit by crisis, monetary policy makers could not ignore the 
situation in the banking sector and adjusted policy to stabilize it.  To conclude, there is hardly any 
conflict  between  monetary  policy  and  financial  stability.    Whatever  conflict  exists,  it  is 
impossible to avoid even if the institutions responsible for the two functions are separated—the 
final outcome is the same, but the way to it is more tortuous.  
Besides enhancing the organization of supervision, it is also very important to establish 
operational internal relations among expert teams contributing to understanding the developments 
in the economy and influencing the conduct of policies.  If financial stability experts conclude 
that there are growing risks to financial stability, the governing body has to consider measures to 
limit  the  risks.    Again,  in  integrated  institution  things  can  proceed  more  smoothly.    In  one 
institution, the governing body can directly and immediately address departments responsible for 
monetary policy and supervision.  If the country’s overall financial structure involves more than 
one central institution, effective action is rather difficult.  Prior to most recent financial crisis, 
financial stability reports of some central banks highlighted the growing risk to financial stability 
without invoking any response from the supervisory agencies.  In one institution, there is a much 
higher probability of action. 
Supervisors  should  listen  more  carefully  to  financial  stability  experts  and  take 
macroeconomic developments into account in their thinking.  Clearly, they have to act somehow 
if a general  consensus  emerges  that macroeconomic imbalances  and asset  market  booms are 
likely to end in a hard landing.  The autonomy of the financial stability team of the supervisory 
body is very important.  First, supervisors tend to be naturally technocratic and by definition look 
at the behavior and status of individual institutions.  Such behavior may lead to underestimation 
of  business-  and  credit-cycle-induced  risks.    Second,  it  might  be  difficult  for  supervisors  to 
emphasize the growth of risks, since these could be viewed as a failure of their work.  Third, 
supervisors are not ready to communicate risks publicly, because it could cause a panic reaction.  
The opinions of financial stability analysts may be viewed as research results, which are much 
easier to communicate publicly. 
6.2 Setting a new macroprudential framework  
The CNB supports the idea that inclusion of a separate financial stability objective and a 
macroprudential policy into an overall policy framework is essential for securing more stable 
developments  in  the financial sector.   Our view is  that the macroprudential  policy  objective 
should be to prevent systemic risk from forming and spreading in the financial system, thereby 
reducing the probability of financial crises with large real output losses for the entire economy.  
By  suppressing  channels  of  formation  and  spread  of  systemic  risk,  macroprudential  policy 
should,  first,  act  preventively  against  signs  of  financial  instability  in  the  future  and,  second, 
mitigate the impacts if prevention fails. 
From  a  general  perspective,  and  given  the  character  of  the  Czech  economy  and  its 
financial system, the time dimension of systemic risk should be regarded as dominant.  The time 
dimension reflects the buildup of systemic risk over time.  The source of this dimension is pro-
cyclicality in the behavior of financial institutions contributing to the formation of unbalanced 
financial trends, which sometimes slip out of the control of institutions themselves or of their 
regulators (see, for example, Brunnermeier et al. 2009; Borio and Drehmann 2009).  However,   22 
the cross-sectional dimension should not be underestimated. Especially in a small open economy, 
connections between institutions in the domestic economy and their links with the international 
economy can both be sources of contagion.  While acknowledging the greater importance of the 
time dimension, the approach to macroprudential policy must therefore cover both dimensions.  
Given the aforementioned characteristics of systemic risk, macroprudential policy can be defined 
as the application of a set of instruments that have the potential to reduce the vulnerability and 
thereby increase the resilience of the system by creating capital and liquidity buffers, by limiting 
pro-cyclicality in  the behavior of the financial system, or by containing risks that individual 
financial institutions may create for the system as a whole. 
All this implies that the main source of the time element of systemic risk is the financial 
cycle.    One of the primary  objectives of macroprudential  policy must therefore be to  create 
incentives for financial institutions to behave less pro-cyclically (Geršl and Jakubík 2010).  A key 
variable describing the evolution of the financial cycle over time is leverage. In its narrower 
sense, this term concerns the relation between the assets of an economic agent and the debt that 
was used to acquire them.
21  In its increasingly used broader sense, it approximates the overall 
nature of the financial cycle and the position of a given economy within it: the indebtedness of 
economic agents, stocks, and dynamics of loans; the availability of external financing; the size of 
interest rate margins and credit spreads; the ratio of assets and capital in financial institutions; the 
length of the lever of financial market investors; and so forth.  
Chart 22. The financial cycle and the evolution of systemic risk 
 
 
Chart 22 shows the evolution of leverage over the financial cycle.  The leverage increases 
until the financial cycle turns over.  Sometimes the turn is disorderly and presents itself as the 
                                                 
21 The term leverage is used in number of areas and therefore has number of different definitions. In the financial 
market  area  it  generally  describes  the  ratio  between  the  total  investment  and  owned  funds  of  an  investor  and 
indicates the degree of use of borrowed external funds. In the case of banks, it refers, for example, to the assets-to-
equity ratio.  
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eruption of financial crisis.  Leverage then starts to decline, although in the early phase of the 
crisis it remains high (given falling nominal GDP it can even rise in the initial post-crisis years).  
The deleveraging phase can last several years, and in the event of a deep crisis the leverage ratio 
can, after a time, fall below its long-term normal value.  Although the leverage level is high on 
both sides of the crisis point, the economic situation is very different on either side.  In the pre-
crisis optimistic phase there is a financial boom occurring, whereas in the post-crisis phase the 
economy is exposed to financial stress.  Consequently, the leverage ratio adjusts to economic 
conditions after a considerable lag, so stock measures have only a limited information value as a 
guide for the macroprudential policy response during the financial cycle. 
The  two  main  tasks  of  macroprudential  policy—to  prevent  systemic  risk  and,  if 
prevention fails, to mitigate the impacts when it materializes—are given by the existence of two 
phases  of development  of systemic  risk.   From the prevention perspective, the main task of 
financial stability analysis is timely identification of the marginal contribution of the current 
financial environment to the accumulation of systemic risk (see the left-hand side of Chart 20).  
This contribution, which can be termed the risk of future financial instability, adds to the buildup 
of systemic risk in a phase of increasing leverage against a backdrop of easy access to cheap 
credit and overoptimistic expectations regarding future income and asset prices.  At a certain 
moment,  however,  economic  agents  will  radically  revise  their  expectations  as  a  result  of 
particular information or a particular event, and a change will occur.  Aspects of crisis will start 
to become apparent and a phase of materialization of the risk accumulated in the preceding phase 
will occur in the form of financial stability.  Banks will revise upward their view of the credit, 
market, and liquidity risk in their balance sheets; increase their credit margins or credit spreads; 
and tighten their lending conditions. Subsequently, a process of deleveraging will start, during 
which the systemic risk will gradually ―de-accumulate.‖ 
Chart 22 illustrates how the process of accumulation of systemic risk (on the left-hand 
side) is followed by the materialization of systemic risk (on the right-hand side).  The magnitude 
or  intensity  of  materialization  is  easier  to  observe.    Compared  with  the  risk  of  financial 
instability, it has the opposite time profile.  This is a reflection of the financial stability paradox: 
sources of systemic risk have a tendency to increase when banks and their clients consider their 
business risks to be the lowest.  In other words, a system is most vulnerable when it looks most 
robust.    In  boom  times,  when  the  risk  of  future  financial  stability  is  increasing,  the  current 
indicators of existing financial risks are usually improving—default rates and NPL ratios are 
falling and banks are provisioning to a lesser extent and reporting smaller credit losses.  On the 
basis of current risk measures, the resilience of the financial sector can seem very high at such 
times. 
The  primary  objective  of  macroprudential  policy  must  be  to  act  preventively  against 
growth in systemic risk in the risk accumulation phase, when conditions are being created for 
future financial instability.  During this phase, analyses have to be focused primarily on the 
identification of latent risks being generated in the balance sheets of financial intermediaries and 
their clients.  When identifying hidden risks, it is important to realize that indicators based on 
present levels of financial variables provide information about the degree of materialization of 
systemic risk but not about the probability of financial stability in the future.
22  In pursuing their 
                                                 
22 In this sense, in the pre-crisis period the CNB regularly drew attention in its analyses and its Financial Stability 
Reports to the fact that the existing NPL ratio could not be considered evidence of low risk, since at a time of rapid 
credit growth, new loans, which are naturally of higher quality initially, dilute the proportion of problem loans.   24 
objectives, authorities must focus on a set of forward-looking indicators providing information on 
the possibility of the future materialization of systemic risk as a result of currently emerging 
financial  imbalances.    This  refers  mainly  to  ―gap‖  indicators  based  on  the  assessment  of 
deviations  of  factors  determining  the  degree  of  leverage  from  their  normal  or  equilibrium 
values.
23  For example, deviations of the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP or the ratio of 
property prices to income from their long -term trends would seem to be relatively reliable 
indicators.  Such indicators send out a signal several years ahead about financi al imbalances in 
financial institutions’  balance  sheets  and  about  the  potential  for  the  creation  of  dangerous 
bubbles.
24  (For more details, see Borio and Drehmann 2009.)  
When assessing systemic risk during the accumulation phase, authorities must first of  all 
reach a general consensus on the normal or sustainable values of the relevant indicators and then 
continuously assess whether the deviations of actual values from normal levels are becoming 
critical. In the systemic risk accumulation phase, this process will not be easy.  It is quite difficult 
to distinguish normal cycle fluctuations and long-term trends from a dangerous financial cycle in 
timely fashion.  Preventive macroprudential tools are not usually activated until a consensus has 
been reached that the critical values of individual indicators—or rather, a combination of a set of 
forward-looking indicators—that have a strong information content regarding the current level of 
risk of future financial instability have been exceeded.  These indicators of the time dimension of 
systemic  risk  will  also  have  to  be  used  when  assessing  the  moment  at  which  the 
prematerialization effects are ceasing to act in a systemic fashion and the anticrisis measures and 
support policies can therefore be discontinued.  These two critical moments that macroprudential 
analysis is tasked with identifying are marked by red lines in Chart 22.  
The  main  intermediate  target  of  the  preventive  instruments  used  in  the  accumulation 
phase of the time component of systemic risk is to increase the resilience of the financial system 
by creating buffers that are then used in the period of materialization of this risk.
25  Sufficient 
capital buffers and a suitable level of provisions increase the ability to absorb unexpected and 
expected losses, while stable balance-sheet liquidity enhances the ability to absorb source shocks.  
The secondary intermediate target is to reduce the amplitude of the financial cycle by suppressing 
lending growth and preventing excessively long maturity transformation s.  Experience with the 
use of macroprudential tools in some countries suggests that their individual effect on the 
financial cycle is limited (Borio 2010).   However, a combination of macroprudential tools and 
macroprudentially applied microprudential instruments (for example, those that create additional 
capital requirements for risk exposures) could help to eliminate manifest excesses over the 
financial cycle.  
In the systemic risk materialization phase, the macroprudential policy priorities will be to 
prevent the elements of instability from escalating, to reduce the probability of panic adjustment 
                                                 
23 A complicating factor is the fact that the risk of financial instability emerges at longer and irregular intervals, 
reflecting the fact that the financial cycle is usually longer than the normal business cycle. 
24 It is much more difficult to obtain reliable forward-looking indicators of the cross-sectional dimension of systemic 
risk. Such indicators are often obtained from prices on financial markets. However, their reliability as risk indicators 
is reduced by the limited efficiency of financial markets.  
25 The main point of macroprudential buffers is to reduce the probability of sudden or panic changes in the behavior 
of financial institutions during a crisis. Capital buffers, for example, allow banks to lend to t he private sector even 
when their losses on previously granted loans are rising and negatively affecting their capital adequacy. Liquidity 
buffers can prevent panic sales of assets under pressure caused by a need to obtain liquidity quickly to cover deposi t 
withdrawal requests or by investors’ unwillingness to roll over short-term bonds issued by banks.   25 
by  financial  institutions  and  their  clients  in  response  to  the  revision  of  expectations,  and  to 
mitigate  the  negative  impacts  of  the  significantly  worse  conditions.    Countercyclical  buffers 
created in good times can be regarded as the most important macroprudential tool for this phase.  
In a systemic crisis, however, a whole range of monetary policy instruments and regulatory and 
supervisory  measures  can  become  macroprudential  in  nature.    On  a  concrete  level, 
macroprudential policy in this phase will act via built-in stabilizers (the release of buffers and the 
use of central banks’ automatic facilities) or crisis management tools (government guarantees for 
bank assets, bad asset transfer programs and balance-sheet cleanups, and capital injections for 
ailing institutions).  Active communication with the financial markets and the public, including 
disclosure of stress tests results, in order to reduce the level of uncertainty about the stability of 
the financial  sector will also  be important.    For example, the CNB moved into more active 
communication mode during the financial crisis and since February 2010 has been providing the 
public with quarterly information about the results of its macro stress tests of the banking sector.  
Communication is a very important tool in the systemic risk accumulation phase as well.  
As to Basel III, internal analysis in the Czech National Bank indicates that the Czech 
banking  sector  will  not  have  substantial  problems  with  implementation.    Higher  capital 
requirements  that  focus  on  common  equity  tier  1  capital,  limiting  leverage,  and  regulating 
liquidity will not harm the functioning of the Czech banking system, as it already now features 
sufficient (tier 1) capital buffer, high liquidity, and relatively low leverage.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper focuses on the banking sector developments and credit in the Czech Republic 
with the emphasis on the pre-crisis years.  It explains that even though the Czech economy had 
experienced  a  credit  boom  similar  to  those  in  other  converging  economies,  the  features  and 
quality of the boom were different.  The approach of the CNB, which acts as both a monetary and 
supervisory authority, has also been different.  The only measures of a macroprudential kind 
targeted  at  credit  growth  consisted  of  open  communication  and  public  warnings.    Prudent 
macroeconomic  policies  and  tough  monetary  conditions  were  the  key  ingredients  of 
macroprudential policy toolkit.  This helped to produce a specific macroeconomic environment 
that has had a strong impact on the risks associated with the operation of the banking sector and 
its  lending  activity.    The  key  building  block  of  monetary  conditions  was  sustained  nominal 
currency appreciation under the regime of a floating exchange rate.  It helped to discipline wage 
dynamics, slow the growth rate of nominal income down, and restrict optimism regarding its 
future trend.  
One  of  the  major  challenges  for  macroprudential  policy  makers  in  the  converging 
economies during the pre-crisis years was detection of the equilibrium trajectory of credit in the 
economy  in  order  to  evaluate  a  period  of  the  excessive  credit  growth.    Although  statistical 
filtering techniques such as the HP filter do have a role in such an analysis as a first step in the 
interpretation of the available data, a broader set of indicators and methods should be employed 
to  determine  a  country’s  position  in  the  credit  cycle.    These  methods  should  reflect  the 
developments of economic fundamentals and thus enable one to identify whether a country is in 
the  state  of  excessive  credit  growth  or  just  catching  up  to  more  advanced  countries  in  its 
economic development.   26 
We conclude that once the good times set in, it may be quite difficult to try to tame credit 
booms  in  small  converging  economies  and  limit  the  probability  of  the  boom-and-bust 
development.    These  are  primarily  macroeconomic  phenomena  associated  with  broad 
socioeconomic  movements.    If  the  international  economy  in  the  future  starts  undergoing  a 
dynamic drive again, accompanied by credit and asset price booms, the authorities should apply a 
concerted set of microprudential and macroprudential measures including fiscal ones to tame the 
immoderate optimism.  Monetary policy should be part of the approach.  Monetary policies might 
need  to  step  in  directly  via  interest-rate  or  exchange-rate  channels  or  indirectly  via 
macroprudential/microprudential tools changing its transmission.  Still, plenty of courage, luck, 
and communication skills would be needed to succeed. 
And finally, the stability of the financial sector in small converging economies very much 
depends on the ability to establish independent, strong, and respected supervision.  Since banking 
largely  remains  a  local  business  based  on  specific  knowledge  of  local  markets,  we  strongly 
recommend  to  the  small  economies  that  are  expected  to  adopt  the  euro  in  the  future  the 
integration of regulation and supervision in independent national central banks.  These integrated 
authorities should include a separate financial stability objective and macroprudential policy in 
their frameworks.  Such a bank’s dominant focus should be the time dimension of systemic risk.  
In this setting, the main task of financial stability analyses has to be timely identification of the 
marginal contribution of the current financial environment to the accumulation of systemic risk: 
the buildup of unbalanced financial trends over time due to the pro-cyclicality in the behavior of 
financial institutions.  Factors mitigating pro-cyclicality embodied in regulation should ensure the 
accumulation of buffers, and better supervision should prevent the bank managers from taking 
excessive risks.  In addition, an important precondition for efficient and effective implementation 
of  macroprudential  policy  is  constitution  of  an  operational  framework  linking  the  analytical 
findings with the decision-making follow-ups. 
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